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Between 2000 and 2050, the share of the population aged 60 and over is projected to increase in 
every country in the world; the same is true for the 80+ population in all but one country (Mali). 
Worldwide, the largest absolute increases are yet to come.  
 
Although labor force participation rates are projected to decline from 2000 to 2040 in most 
countries, due mainly to changes in their age distributions, labor-force-to-population ratios will 
actually  increase  in  most  countries.  This  is  because  low  fertility  will  cause  lower  youth 
dependency that is more than enough to offset the skewing of adults toward the older ages at 
which labor force participation is lower. The increase in labor-force-to-population ratios will be 
further magnified by increases in age-specific rates of female labor force participation associated 
with  fertility  declines.  These  factors  suggest  that  economic  growth  will  continue  apace, 
notwithstanding the phenomenon of population aging.   
 
For the OECD countries, the declines projected to occur in both labor force participation and 
labor-force-to-population ratios suggest modest declines in the pace of economic growth. But 
even these effects can be mitigated by behavioral responses to population aging – in the form of 
higher savings for retirement, greater labor force participation, and increased immigration from 
labor-surplus to labor-deficit countries. Countries that can facilitate such changes may be able to 
limit  the  adverse  consequences  of  population  aging.  When  seen  through  the  lens  of  several 
mitigating considerations, there is reason to think that population aging in developed countries 
may have less effect than some have predicted. In addition, policy responses related to retirement 
incentives, pension funding methods, investments in health care of the elderly, and immigration 
can further ameliorate the effect of population aging on economic growth.    
Population Aging and Economic Growth 
 





The  world  is  entering  substantially  uncharted  waters  in  terms  of  the  size  of  its  elderly 
populations. Recent declines in fertility rates and increases in life expectancy, combined with the 
dynamic evolution of past variations in birth and death rates are producing a significant shift in 
the global age structure. The number of people over the age of 60 is expected to reach 1 billion 
by 2020 and almost 2 billion by 2050 (representing 22 percent of the world’s population). The 
proportion of individuals aged 80 or over (the so-called “oldest old”) is projected to rise from 1 
percent to 4 percent of the global population by 2050.
1  
 
There is also mounting evidence that the elderly are healthier than before. In a phenomenon 
referred to by demographers and health specialists as the “compression of morbidity”, the length 
of healthy old-age appears to be increasing. Part of this increase is due to increases in the length 
of life, and part to even greater increases in the length of life free of chronic illness. The net 
effect is a decline in the lifetime burden of illness (as measured in years unwell).  
 
Since different age groups have different economic needs and productive capacities, a country's 
economic characteristics may be expected to change as its population ages. A standard approach 
to assessing these changes is to assume constant age-specific behavior with respect to earnings, 
employment,  and  savings,  and  to  assess  the  implications  of  changes  in  the  relative  size  of 
different age groups for these fundamental contributors to national income. However, the simple 
application of this approach is likely to be misleading. Behavior changes induced by changing 
expectations about the life cycle and by predictable demographic shifts are likely to influence the 
economic consequences of aging. For example, individuals’ expectation of living longer than 
previous generations may induce them to remain in work for longer and to begin to draw down 
savings  at  a  later  age.  In  addition,  the  links  between  population  aging  and  macroeconomic 
performance are mediated by the institutional context (for example, retirement policy, pension 
and health care finance, the efficiency of labor and capital markets, and the structure of regional 
and global economic systems). The policy environment may itself be influenced by population 
aging, depending on the voting and other political behavior of an aging electorate whose needs 
and interests may differ from those of younger people.  
 
This paper examines the effects of population aging on economic growth. It begins by presenting 
and analyzing descriptive statistics on the extent and pace of population aging. The paper then 
explores  the  overall  effect  of  population  aging  on  economic  growth  as  well  as  the  effects 
operating  via  two  main  channels  through  which  growth  can  occur:  labor  supply  and  capital 
accumulation.  Accounting effects of population aging on factor accumulation and economic 
growth are distinguished from behavioral effects. The final section highlights the important role 
played by the policy and institutional environment in mediating the economic growth effects of 
                                                 
1 The United Nations makes several separate forecasts of population size, including ones based on low-, medium-, 
and high-fertility assumptions. This paper uses the UN's medium-fertility scenario except where otherwise stated.   2 
population aging. This section also discusses a variety of demographic, behavioral, and policy 
forces pertinent to understanding and guiding the effect of population aging on economic growth.       
 
 
II. Population Aging: Facts, Force, and Future 
 
In this section, we lay out some of the key facts regarding past and projected future population 
aging, and briefly consider some of the policy implications that these facts highlight. The data 
will serve as anchors for the economic analyses that will be developed in subsequent sections. 
First we look at UN population projections. Next we examine the factors underlying the rise in 
the elderly population. We then take a brief look at how population trends will affect the options 
faced by policymakers. 
 
 
Population data and projections 
 
Population projections from the United Nations change as new estimates are published every two 
years. For example, forecasts of the total world population in 2050 declined from about 10 to 9 
billion people between 1994 and 2006. One might have expected projections of the number of 
people aged 60 or above and 80 or above would be far more stable, since all those who will reach 
those ages in the next six decades have already been born, so unpredictable changes in fertility 
need not be taken into account. However, these projections have changed significantly, even in 
recent years, as shown in Exhibit 1. With each UN publication, the latest available data are taken 
into account. In some instances, a large amount of new census data is available, which can lead 
to significant differences in the estimate of future population size. The same is true of updated 
fertility  and  mortality  data.  The  greatest  proportionate  differences  shown  here  are  for  the 
forecasted  size  of  the  80+  population  in  2050.  For  the  world,  developed  countries,  and 
developing countries, the UN estimate of the size of this age group has risen by 20% or more 
since 1994. These figures show that population data are not sacrosanct; as the estimated sizes of 
current  populations  and  age  groups  within  them  change,  and  as  fertility  and  mortality  rates 
change  in  a  manner  that  is  different  from  earlier  predictions,  population  estimates  of  future 
population size will also change.  
   3 
Exhibit 1 – Change in UN forecast of 2050 elderly population, from 1994 to 2006 
 
Forecast year Total 60+ 80+
World 1994 9.83 1.97 0.33
1996 9.37 1.94 0.32
1998 8.91 1.97 0.37
2000 9.32 1.96 0.38
2002 8.92 1.91 0.38
2004 9.08 1.97 0.39
2006 9.19 2.01 0.40
% change, 94-00 -5.2% -0.3% 14.7%
% change, 00-06 -1.4% 2.1% 6.0%
% change, 94-06 -6.5% 1.9% 21.7%
Developed countries 1994 1.21 0.36 0.09
1996 1.16 0.36 0.09
1998 1.16 0.38 0.10
2000 1.18 0.40 0.11
2002 1.22 0.39 0.11
2004 1.24 0.40 0.12
2006 1.25 0.41 0.12
% change, 94-00 -2.2% 9.5% 21.2%
% change, 00-06 5.4% 2.7% 3.9%
% change, 94-06 3.1% 12.6% 26.0%
Developing countries 1994 8.63 1.61 0.24
1996 8.20 1.58 0.23
1998 7.75 1.59 0.27
2000 8.14 1.57 0.27
2002 7.70 1.51 0.26
2004 7.84 1.57 0.28
2006 7.95 1.60 0.28
% change, 94-00 -5.6% -2.5% 12.2%
% change, 00-06 -2.4% 2.0% 6.9%




Source: Authors' calculations based on data in the 1994 through 2006 revisions of United Nations, World Population 
Prospects. 
 
Demographic projections of population aging suggest the world is experiencing a historically 
unprecedented phenomenon.
2  The 60+ and 80+ age groups’ shares of the total population are 
higher than at any time in history, and their growth is accelerating. The number aged 60 or over 
has increased from 200 million in 1950 to around 670 million today. By 2050, it is projected to 
reach 2 billion (see Exhibit 2). The number aged 80+ has risen from 14 million in 1950 to nearly 
                                                 
2 For a detailed analysis of several measures of population aging, see Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov (2008).   4 
90 million today, and by 2050 it will have passed 400 million if current projections are borne 
out. Older age cohorts, moreover, are beginning to account for a substantial proportion of the 
total population. Indeed, all countries and other entities are forecast to see a higher share of 
people aged 60+ in 2050 than in 2000, with the percentage-point increase ranging from 0.3 in 
Benin to 33 in Macao. (By contrast, numerous countries experienced large drops in this fraction 
between 1950 and 2000.) 
 






































These projections are based on the UN's medium-fertility scenario. If fertility rates in the coming 
decades are lower than the "medium scenario" estimate, the share of elderly in the population 
will rise. Exhibit 3 shows how this source of uncertainty leads to a range of predictions regarding 
elderly share. The variation in 2050 is about one-third of the medium-scenario elderly share. This 
is  not  a  huge  range,  and  all  three  scenarios  point  in  the  same  direction.  But  this  source  of 
uncertainty is in addition to that reflected by the change over time in UN estimates of the future 
size of the elderly population. 
   5 









































Exhibit 4 is another way of viewing the change in the age structure of the world's population 
over time. Each colored slice shows the age distribution at one point in time.  The elderly share 
will be much higher in 2050 than it is now. 
 

















































Source: UN, World 
Population 
Prospects, the 2006 
Revision
   6 
 
The phenomenon of population aging, of course, is not uniform across countries. In addition, the 
extent of aging varies considerably between the developed and the developing countries (see 
Exhibits 5 and 6) and across regions (see Exhibit 7). 
 




0-14 866              1,845           1,824          
15-59 1,464           3,997           5,361          
60-79 191              585              1,604          
80+ 14                88                402             
Total 2,535           6,515           9,191          
Developed countries
0-14 223              207              190             
15-59 496              764              650             
60-79 87                200              289             
80+ 9                  44                117             
Total 814              1,216           1,245          
Developing countries
0-14 644              1,638           1,635          
15-59 968              3,233           4,712          
60-79 104              385              1,315          
80+ 6                  43                284             




Source: Authors' calculations based on data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. 
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Source: Authors' calculations based on data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision 
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Much  of  the  developed  world  already  has  large  elderly  cohorts.  Twenty  per  cent  of  the 
population of developed countries is aged over 60 today, and this will rise to over 30 per cent in 
the next four decades (see Exhibit 8). In the developing world, less than 10 per cent of the 
population is aged over 60. By 2050, however, the proportion is expected to more than double,   8 
and the 60+ age group will comprise 20 per cent of India’s population and 30 per cent of China's 
by the middle of this century – a total of over 760 million people. 
 























As above, Exhibit 9 offers another view of the same data.  
 




















































Source: UN, World 
Population 
Prospects, the 2006 
Revision
 
   9 
Countries will also undergo aging at very different rates. Exhibit 10 focuses on two sets of 
countries: those that are forecast to have the highest share of 60+ individuals in 2050, and those 
with the largest percentage point increase in that share between 2000 and 2050. (Only countries 
with current populations greater than 2 million are considered.) 
 
Exhibit 10 – Countries with highest 2050 elderly population or rapid change from 2000-2050 
 
% 60+ in 2050   
Percentage point increase in 
60+ share, 2000-2050 
         
Japan  44.0    South Korea  30.7 
South Korea  42.2    Singapore  29.3 
Slovenia  40.5    Cuba  24.5 
Bulgaria  40.2    Poland  22.9 
Singapore  39.8    Kuwait  22.3 
Poland  39.6    Slovakia  22.2 
Cuba  39.3    UAE  22.1 
Romania  39.1    Slovenia  21.1 
Spain  39.0    China  21.0 
Czech Republic  38.6    Japan  20.7 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. 
 
Exhibit  11  shows  the  expected  growth  of  the  elderly  population  for  four  large  developing 
countries. In three of them, population aging will be a major demographic trend between now 
and 2050. 
 
Population aging will be accompanied by changes in the sex composition of the population. 
(Gerland  2005  notes  that  in  most  countries,  the  decades-long  divergence  in  adult  survival 
between men and women has decreased since 1980, "caused by both a deceleration/leveling of 
female survival and an acceleration of male survival".) More male than female babies are born, 
but the death rate of male babies and of adult men has long been higher than that of their female 
counterparts.  This  led  to  the  longstanding  and  widely  recognized  phenomenon  of  the 
predominance of women among the elderly. Better health at all ages is causing this disparity in 
longevity to diminish. Exhibit 12 shows the UN's forecasts of male/female ratios in 2050 as 
compared to the present. In 2050, among 15-59 year-olds, males will slightly outnumber females 
in  both  developed  and  developing  countries.  Among  the  elderly,  females  will  continue  to 
outnumber males, in both developed and developing countries.   10 
Exhibit 11 –  Elderly share (%) in selected developing countries (60+ is teal, and 80+ is orange) 
 

























   


























Source: Authors' calculations based on data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. 
 
 
   11 





















World Developed countries Developing countries
Source: 
Authors' calculations based on data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision 
 
 
The drivers of aging 
 
There are three main factors behind the past and projected changes in the share of the global 
population aged 60+ and 80+. First, declining fertility rates in recent decades have reduced the 
number of young people and pushed up the share of the elderly. The total fertility rate fell from 
approximately 5 children per woman in 1950 to just over 2.5 in 2005. It is expected to fall to 2 
children per woman by 2050.
3 Most of this decline has occurred in the developing world – as 
Exhibit 13 shows, this will contribute to a near halving of the share of children in the population 
of developing countries between 1965 and 2050.  
 
                                                 
3 UN Population Division (2005).    12 























And as before, Exhibit 14 gives a three-dimensional view of the same data. 
 

















































Source: UN, World 
Population 
Prospects, the 2006 
Revision
 
   13 
The second key factor relates to recent increases in life expectancy. We calculate, for example, 
that one-fifth of the rise in India's 60+ population projected between 2000 and 2050 is due to 
rising life expectancy during that period. The corresponding figure for China is one-seventh.
4 
Global life expectancy has increased from 47 years in 1950 to over 65 today. It is projected by 
the  UN  Population  Division  to  reach  75  years  by  2045.
5  Both  developed  and  developing 
countries are seeing rises in life expectancy, despite HIV/AIDS reversing the trend in some low- 
and middle-income  countries (Exhibit 15). As  many more people survive into their 60s  and 
beyond, the absolute number of elderly will soar. Combined with fertility declines, this will also 
result in a sharp increase in the share of elderly in the overall population.  
 
Exhibit 15 – Life expectancy, by level of development  
 
There is much debate about whether there is a limit to increases in life expectancy. Some have 
forecast that life expectancy in the wealthy industrial countries will surpass 100 years before  
2100 as anti-aging and medical technologies become more widespread and sophisticated and as 
lifestyles  become  healthier,  for  example  via  declines  in  smoking  and  alcohol  abuse, 
improvements in diet, universal use of seatbelts, etc. Others are less optimistic, believing that life 
expectancy will plateau at 85 years. The latter school of thought holds that past increases are due 
mostly  to  declines  in  infant  and  child  mortality  that  are  not  repeatable  and  thus  will  not 
contribute to further increases in life expectancy. It argues too that major new threats, such as 
avian flu, climate change, and obesity, will hold life expectancy down. Although the likely extent 
of increases is disputed, the fact that life expectancy will continue to rise is widely accepted.  
 
                                                 
4 This calculation was made by comparing projections of India's population and age distribution from 2000 to 2050 
using (a) linearly interpolated values of the UN Population Division's assumptions of the TFR and life expectancy in 
2000 and 2050, and (b) linearly interpolated values of the UN Population Division's assumptions of the TFR with 
life expectancy held constant at its 2000 level. A similar calculation was made for China, except that life expectancy 
for women was fixed at 80 beyond the year 2035, due to a restriction imposed by the software package DemProj. 












Source: UN, World 
Population 
Prospects 2006.   14 
Past variations in birth and death rates are the third factor behind population aging. For example, 
baby  booms  that  occurred  in  rich  countries  after  World  War  II  are  now  shifting  population 
structure as the swollen cohort of boomers, which resulted from increased – and not decreased – 
fertility, passes the age of 60. In parts of the developing world too, where fertility temporarily 
increased as health improvements reduced child mortality, elderly populations have been and 




From  a  policy  perspective,  the  aging  of  the  world’s  population  presents  a  number  of  major 
challenges. Its unprecedented nature, moreover, means that we cannot look to earlier historical 
episodes for guidance on how this demographic upheaval will play itself out, nor on how best to 
manage it. On the other hand, population aging in most countries will not be noticeable for 
another ten to twenty years. As the charts above show, the most rapid increase in aging has not 
yet occurred. This  gives policymakers  a window of opportunity in  which to prepare for the 
change.  Initiating  action  early  can  leave  countries  better  positioned  to  deal  with  the  social, 
economic, and political effects of an altered population structure in the future.  
 
People  aged  60  or  above  tend  to  have  different  needs  and  different  behaviors  than  younger 
generations. Older individuals, for example, tend to work and save less, meaning that less labor 
and capital will be available to economies. They also require more health care and, in many 
countries, rely on social pensions for a large part of their income. Politically, therefore, it might 
become more difficult to adopt certain policies, such as cutting health and pension benefits, as 
elder populations become politically more potent. Economically, there will be increased stress on 
working populations, whose taxes pay for the health care and pensions of their elders but whose 
numbers relative to those elders will be reduced.  
 
Those aged 80 or over also have different needs. Their health is generally weaker than that of 
people aged between 60 and 80, they have a greater need for full-time care, and their financial 
needs may be greater due to the costs of care and because they have had longer to draw down 
savings.  As  their  numbers  increase,  they  place  further  demands  on  government  resources, 
familial resources, and personal savings.  
 
That a greater share of elderly will put societies and economies under intolerable strain is not 
inevitable,  however.  Increased  life  expectancy  has  historically  been  strongly  associated  with 
increased  per-capita  income.
6  Changes  in  age-specific  health  profiles  are  important  for 
characterizing the phenomenon of population aging. If people moving into their 60s and 70s are 
healthier than preceding generations, the demands for health care will be less intense and many 
will be able to work, and contribute to economies, for longer.
7 If they remain no healthier than 
earlier cohorts, on the other hand, they will have to endure more years of poor health and their 
societies  will  be  burdened  with  additional  years  of  health  care  costs.  Studies  on  whether 
increased life expectancy is accompanied by a “compression of morbidity”, where the relative or 
                                                 
6 SH Preston (1975): The Changing Relation between Mortality and Level of Economic Development. Population 
Studies, 29(2): 231-248 
7 Kulish M, K Smith and C Kent (2006), ‘Ageing, Retirement and Savings: A General Equilibrium Analysis’, 
Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper No 2006-06.   15 
absolute length of life spent in chronic ill-health falls, have mainly focused on the United States. 
Most suggest that compression of morbidity does indeed occur, meaning that the burden of aging 
is reduced.
8 Those over 60 can work more productively for longer and place fewer demands on 
public resources.  
 
Cross-country  differences  in  the  timing  of  the  aging  process  may  also  mitigate  the  negative 
impacts. Because rich countries are aging faster than poor ones, the former can draw on labor 
from  the  latter  to  compensate  for  the  retirement  of  their  own  people.  The  large  cohorts  of 
working-age people in developing countries, in turn, are likely to be keen to fill the vacancies 
created.  
 
Migration to the developed world could therefore theoretically slow the latter’s shift toward an 
aged  population  and  ease  the  pressure  on  economies.  Migration,  however,  can  bring  with  it 
social pressures and unrest, and many wealthy countries are already grappling with the difficult 
balance between the need for labor and the importance of taking account of immigration’s social 
effects.  Some  have  observed  the  different  –  but  highly  complementary  –  age  structures  of 
developed and developing regions and suggested that "replacement migration" might serve the 
purposes of both sets of regions. Europe, for example, with a high percentage of elderly people 
and few children, needs workers, which Sub-Saharan Africa could readily supply. Exhibit 16 
shows the ratio of working-age to non-working-age people in Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa 
separately, as well as the ratio for the two regions added together. The time path of the working-
age ratio for the two regions taken together is steadier than that of either region.  
 














































Europe Sub-Saharan Africa total
Source: United Nations, World 
Population Prospects, 2004  
                                                 
8 Fries, J. (1980), Aging, Natural death and the Compression of Morbidity, New England Journal of. Medicine 303, 
130-135; Fries, J (1989): The compression of morbidity: near or far? Milbank Quarterly 67, 208-32; Crimmins, E. 
(2004). Trends in the Health of the Elderly. Annual Review of Public Health, 25, 79-98; Crimmins, E., Saito, Y., & 
Ingegneri, D. (1997). Trends in disability-free life expectancy in the U.S.: 1970-1990. Population and Development 
Review, 23(3), 555-572; Costa, DL. 2002. Changing chronic disease rates and long-term declines in. functional 
limitation among older men. Demography 39(1): 119–137.    16 
 
Notwithstanding  the  theoretical  soundness  of  the  idea  of  replacement  migration,  we  have 
calculated that it would take more than a 30-fold increase in the current level of migration from 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  to  Europe  –  which  would  need  to  last  for  25  years  –  to  achieve  this 
smoothing.
9 This is hardly realistic, especially given the social and political tensions that even 
current rates of African migration to Europe raise. The goal of “replacement migration” thus 
appears to be much more interesting in theory than in practice. Given the massive increase in 
migration that would be needed to appreciably offset the impacts of population aging in Europe, 
international migration offers at best a partial solution to the problem – and one that comes with 
potentially great social and political costs.  
 
Increased capital flows are an alternative way of addressing this same issue (i.e., exporting jobs 
instead of importing workers), although the demand for services that require physical proximity 
(e.g., gardeners, hair stylists, and security guards, as opposed to call center operators, investment 
analysts, and radiologists) would appear to place some limits on this market-based channel for 
adjusting to population aging.         
 
In the next section of the paper, we examine more closely some of the impacts of aging discussed 
above and in particular their implications for economic growth. 
 
 
III. The Economic Impacts of Population Aging 
 
The importance of age structure 
 
The academic literature is overflowing with models and perspectives  on the determinants of 
economic  growth.  Some  frameworks  highlight  the  importance  of  sectoral  shift  (that  is,  the 
reallocation  of  labor  from  the  low  productivity  agricultural  sector  to  the  higher  productivity 
industry  and  service  sectors)  and  the  improvement  of  productivity  within  all  sectors.  Others 
emphasize the contribution to growth of technological progress, human capital, institutions and 
governance, macroeconomic and trade policies, and random shocks. Still others stress feedback 
effects that run from economic growth to technical progress and human capital accumulation, 
which in turn influence economic growth.
10  
 
The key premise of this paper is that changes in population age structure may exert a significant 
influence on economic growth. We adopt a life cycle perspective, based on the fact that people’s 
economic needs and contributions vary over the life cycle. Specifically, the ratio of consumption 
to production tends to be high for the youth and elderly and low for working-age adults. This 
                                                 
9 See Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2002). 
10 Tyers and Shi (2007) introduce demographics (population size and its age, sex, and skill composition) into a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the world economy with exogenously-determined age patterns of 
labor force participation, consumption, and savings. Their work indicates that accelerated population aging (via 
lower fertility) tends to enhance real per capita income growth in regions with very young populations and slows 
it in regions with older populations and low rates of labor force participation among the elderly (e.g., Western 
Europe). Based on a model that is similar in spirit, though demographically less fine-grained, McKibbin (2006) 
reaches qualitatively similar conclusions, but also highlights the implications of global demographic change for 
international trade and capital flows and therefore for domestic economic performance.   17 
means  that  aggregate  labor  supply,  productivity,  earnings,  and  savings  –  all  key  drivers  of 
economic growth – will tend to vary depending on where most people are in the life cycle. 
Among  these  factors,  it  is  well  established  that  labor  supply  and  savings  are  higher  among 
working-age adults than among those aged 60 or above. Other things equal, therefore, a country 
with large cohorts of youth and elderly is likely to experience slower growth than one with a 
high proportion of working-age people.  
 
The value of this approach can be seen in an analysis of the impact of changing age structure on 
East Asia’s remarkable economic growth in the second half of the 20
th century.
11 Rapid declines 
in infant and child mortality in the region began in the late 1940s. These declines triggered a 
subsequent fall in fertility rates – the crude birth rate dropped from over 40 births per 1,000 
population in 1950 to just over 20 by 1980. During the lag between falling mortality and fertility, 
a “baby boom” generation was created, which was larger than the cohorts that preceded and 
followed it. As this generation reached working age, it boosted savings rates and also the size of 
the labor force; from 1965 to 1990, the working-age population grew by 2.6 per cent annually 
and the dependent population by just 1.0 per cent. Bloom and Williamson (1998), and Bloom, 
Canning, and Malaney (2000) estimate that this “demographic dividend” explains up to one-third 





If age-specific behavior with respect to labor supply and savings were fixed, labor supply and 
savings per capita – and hence income growth – would tend to decline with a rising elder share 
of  the  population.  Based  on  this  view  of  the  link  between  population  aging  and  economic 
growth, rapid aging has the potential to induce a correspondingly sharp reduction in the pace of 
growth. This frame of reference appears to underlie the rather alarmist views of commentators 
such as Peter Peterson, who has argued that, “global aging could trigger a crisis that engulfs the 
world economy [and] may even threaten democracy itself.”
12 Ken Dychtwald, too, has raised 
concerns  that,  “we’re  going  to  have  a  self-centered  generation  just  sucking  down  all  the 
resources”,
13 and former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has warned that aging 




In order to assess the potential magnitude of the impact of an increase in the share of elderly, we 
estimate the pure accounting effect of population aging on labor supply. We do this by applying 
International  Labor  Organization  (ILO)  estimates  of  age-  and  sex-specific  labor  force 
participation rates to UN projections of the corresponding distributions of population by age and 
sex  for  the  year  2040.  We  then  compare  these  numbers  to  the  actual  rates  of  labor  force 
                                                 
11 Bloom, David E. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging 
Asia", World Bank Economic Review, 1998, Vol. 12, No. 3, 419–55.   
12 PG Peterson (1999): Gray Dawn: The Global Aging Crisis. Foreign Affairs, January/February. 
13 San Francisco Chronicle (1999): Ken Dychtwald on the Future. November 15. Available at: http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/1999/11/15/dychtwaldtalk.DTL 
14 Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Aging global population”, before the Special Committee on Aging, 
U.S. Senate February 27, 2003   18 
participation (LFPR) in 2000.
15 The results for the 174 countries in the ILO database are shown 
in Exhibits 17 and 18, where we plot actual LFPR in 1960 versus actual LFPR in 2000, and 
actual LFPR in 2000 versus projected LFPR in 2040. For convenience, we show the 45-degree 
line, which corresponds to static rates of labor force participation.  
 
Exhibit 17 shows that LFPR increased in slightly more countries than it decreased in from 1960 
to 2000, corresponding to the demographic transition in developing countries and the post-World 
War II baby booms in the developed countries. The scatterplot also reveals a demographic cycle 
of sorts, with high (low) LFPR in 1960 tending to correspond to lower (higher) LFPR in 2000. 
Rising rates of labor force participation create the potential for higher rates of economic growth. 
 






















However, the situation looks rather different going forward. Exhibit 18 projects that changes in 
the  age  distribution  –  and  also  in  the  sex  distribution  –  of  the  population  will,  under  the 
assumption of constant age- and sex-specific LFPR, cause the aggregate LFPR to decrease in 
more countries than it will increase in from 2000 to 2040. In Singapore and Hong Kong, China, 
for example, LFPR is projected to decline from around 60% to 45%. Spain, Austria, Germany, 
and the Netherlands are projected to experience similar declines. For the 174 countries taken as a 
whole,  LFPR  is  projected  to  decline  from  66.4%  in  2000  to  62.1%  in  2040  (Exhibit  19). 
                                                 
15 The calculations are carried out as follows: We use male and female labor force participation rates from the ILO 
for each 5 year age group between 14-19 and 60-64, and an average for the population 65plus. We match these data 
to the UN data on population stocks, which provides data on the number of males/females in each corresponding 5-
year age group. Multiplying each age group with the participation rate gives us the total number of people working. 
We then sum these, and divide by the population ages 15 plus. For the years 1960 and 2000, we use actual 
participation rates. For the year 2040, we use the participation rates from 2000 and the age structure forecast from 
the World Population Prospects United Nations (2007). World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. CD-ROM 
Edition - Extended Dataset. United Nations. 
   19 
Although this is a shift from the 1960-2000 experience (during which LFPR barely changed -- 
from 67.4% to 66.4%), the 4.3 percentage point decline represents less than half of a standard 
deviation (9.5 percent) in the cross-country distribution of LFPR for 2000. 
 
























Exhibit 19: Global Labor Force: 1960, 2000, and 2004 
 
  1960 Actual  2000 Actual  2040 Projected* 
LFPR (labor force/pop15 +)  67.4  66.4  62.1 
LFTP (labor force/pop)  42.4  46.5  48.6 
 
* 2040 projections are based on medium-fertility population projection and age- and gender-specific participation rates in 2000. 
Averages are population weighted. 
 
To draw further attention to the small magnitude of the shift of demography from boon to bane 
with respect to economic growth, Exhibit 20 plots ratios of labor force-to-population (LFTP) in 
2000 and 2040 (the numbers for 2040 again being projected under the assumption that age- and 
sex-specific LFPR will remain constant at their 2000 levels). The striking result here is that 
increases outnumber decreases with respect to LFTP. In other words, projected fertility declines 
imply that the fall in youth dependency is more than enough to offset the skewing of adults 
toward the older ages at which labor force participation is lower. For the 174 countries taken as a 
whole, the calculation of LFTP actually projects a rise from 46.5% to 48.6% between 2000 and 
2040 (Exhibit 19).    
   20 
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Note: 2040 projections are based on medium-fertility population projection and age- and gender-specific participation rates in 
2000.  
 
Exhibit 21 plots actual annual growth rates of  per capita income  from 1960 to 2000 for 97 
countries  against  counterfactual  growth  rates  during  that  period.  The  counterfactual  is 
constructed by taking note of the fact that income per capita equals income per worker times 
workers per capita. In terms of growth rates, this means that the growth rate of income per capita 
equals  the  sum  of  the  growth  rates  of  income  per  worker  and  workers  per  capita
16.  The 
simulation makes the assumption that income per worker grew at the actual 1960-2000 rate, but 
that the growth rate of workers per capita followed the expected 2000-2040 trajectory, instead of 
the actual growth rate in workers per capita observed during 1960-2000. Exhibit 21 thus provides 
a crude indication of the impact of demographic change on economic growth. The comparison is 
crude for a variety of reasons: it does not allow demographic change to affect behavior with 
respect to labor supply or savings, nor does it account for any changes in institutions or policies. 
OECD countries, whose populations are aging faster than the rest of the world, appear in red.  
 
There are two key features of Exhibit 21. First, the data points are evenly scattered around the 45 
degree line, which implies that the shift in age structure will, on average for the world, have little 
effect on economic growth. Indeed, for the 97 countries for which the requisite income data are 
available for both 1960 and 2000, the average actual growth rate during 1960-2000 is 1.9%, 
which is identical to the average counterfactual growth rate. The largest deviation from the 45 
degree line is for Singapore. Its actual growth rate of 5% from 1960 to 2000 occurred partly on 
                                                 
16 Using a logarithmic approximation, the growth in GDP per capita between period t and period t+1 is given by 
ln(GDP per capitat)-ln(GDP per capitat-1). Since GDP per capita = GDP per worker x workers per capita, it is easy to 
show that growth can be expressed as ln(GDP per workert/GDP per workert-1)+ln(workers per capitat/workers per 
capitat-1).   21 
the strength of an 18 percentage point rise in labor force per capita from 33% to 51%. But in the 
counterfactual  calculation,  Singapore’s  labor  force  per  capita  will  decline  by  11  percentage 
points,  a  very  pessimistic  assumption.  In  fact,  taking  the  period  1960  to  2000  as  a  whole, 
Singapore’s labor force per capita is expected to rise from 33% to 40%, which means that the net 
demographic contribution to the growth in income per capita is actually positive over the full 
sample period.     
 
Second, with the sole (unsurprising) exception of Turkey, all of the OECD country points lie 
below the 45 degree line, indicating that the direction of population aging will be to depress 
economic growth. Yet, even among the original OECD countries, the average actual growth rate 
during 1960-2000 is 2.8%, which is only modestly reduced to 2.1% in the counterfactual. It is 
worth stressing that the counterfactual is likely to overestimate the real effect of the demographic 
shifts,  since  it  essentially  compares  growth  rates  with  very  favorable  demographic  shifts  to 
growth rates with very unfavorable demographic shifts without taking any behavioral changes 
into account. Taken as a whole, this very basic analysis implies that population aging does not 
represent an economic problem for the world economy. Rather, it is at most a modest issue for 
particular economies.  
 
Exhibit 21 – Actual and Counterfactual Annual Growth Rates of Income per Capita, 1960-2000 
(counterfactual assumes 2000-2040 growth rate of labor force per capita; original OECD countries are shown 
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The role of behavior change 
 
These  calculations,  however,  reflect  pure  accounting  effects,  assuming  constant  age-specific 
behavior.  They are likely to represent upper bounds on the magnitude of the effect of aging on 
labor  supply  and,  since  they  neglect  behavior  change  in  response  to  rising  longevity,  may 
therefore be misleading.  
 
Behavioral responses to population aging can occur in the form of higher savings for retirement, 
greater  labor  force  participation,  and  increased  immigration  of  workers  (primarily  from 
developing to developed countries). Countries with the institutional flexibility to facilitate these 
behavioral changes will be in a position to mitigate the adverse consequences of population 
aging.  
 
Individuals faced with the prospect of increased life expectancy, where instead of dying in their 
50s or 60s they can now expect to live well into their 80s, have a number of choices to smooth 
their financial path.  First, they can rely on social security payments, although these may be 
imperiled by demographically induced stress on government finances.   
 
Second, they can work longer to finance consumption in later years. Bloom, Canning, and Moore 
(2007) have shown that the theoretically optimal response to an exogenous rise in life expectancy 
is to increase working life proportionately, without increasing savings rates.
17 In an environment 
where lengthened life expectancy is accompanied by compression of morbidity, people will have 
greater ability to work productively for longer, without decreasing the amount of years spent in 
retirement.  According  to  Kulish,  Smith,  and  Kent  (2006),  they  also  desire  to  work  longer; 
individuals surveyed in Australia wish to spend a similar proportion of their lives in retirement as 
life expectancy increases.
18 In practice, however, most countries with social security systems 
penalize those who wish to work beyond “retirement age”. Mandatory retirement is the most 
extreme of these penalties but, as Gruber and Wise (1998) have shown, there are many other 
social  security  arrangements  that  provide  strong  incentives  to  retire  rather  than  continue 
working.
19 The large spike in retirement at age 62 in the United States (the earliest age at which 
Social Security benefits can be claimed), and another spike at age 65 (an age at which new 
retirees have access to even larger benefits) show that people respond to these incentives.
20 This 
behavioral response to social security arrangements is evidenced in Bloom, Canning, Fink, and 
Finlay (2007a) which shows that institutional settings have strong effects on male labor supply 
for the 55-plus age groups in a broad sample of countries.
21  
 
                                                 
17 Bloom, David E., David Canning, Rick Mansfield and Michael Moore (2007): “Demographic Change, Social 
Security Systems, and Savings”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54(1), pp 92-114.  
18 Kulish et al (2006) op cit. 
19 Gruber, Jonathan and David Wise. 1998. "Social Security and Retirement: an International Comparison. American 
Economic Review 88(2): 158-163 
20 Burtless, G., and R.A. Moffitt 1984. The effect of Social Security benefits on the labor supply of the aged. Pp. 
135–174 in H.J. Aaron and G. Burtless, eds., Retirement and Economic Behavior. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution. 1985. 
21 Bloom, David E., David Canning, Guenther Fink, and Jocelyn Finlay, 2007, “Demographic Change, Institutional 
Settings and Labor Supply, mimeo.   23 
The difficulty of working beyond national retirement ages and the precarious prospects for social 
security  payments  often  mean  individuals  resort  to  a  third  option  –  saving  more  to  finance 
consumption later. Although the theoretically optimal response to longer life would be to work 
longer  and  not  increase  savings,  the  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  in  fact  people  base 
decisions on the assumption of longer periods of retirement, and savings therefore rise. Bloom, 
Canning,  and  Graham  (2003)  find  that  increased  life  expectancy  is  associated  with  higher 
savings rates.
22 More recent work suggests that savings rates increase with life expectancy in 
countries with universal pension coverage and retirement incentives, but not in countries with 
pay-as-you-go systems and high replacement rates.
23 Economic incentives to promote greater 
immigration are also likely to strengthen as populations age; outsourcing work is also likely to 
become an increasingly attractive option.
24 
 
A  fourth  way  for  societies  to  adjust  to  aging  is  via  increased  labor  force  participation.  The 
reduced fertility that contributes to the shift towards an older age structure allows more women 
to enter the labor force, as highlighted in Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay (2007)
25, which can 
potentially compensate somewhat for the retirement of the elderly. We show the magnitude of 
these  effects  in  Exhibit  22.  The  bottom  row  of  the  exhibit  shows  the  actual  labor  force  to 
population ratios in 2000 for females only  (column 1), and the total population (column 2), 
respectively. In the upper part of the table, we show the predicted values of female and total 
LFTP between 2000 and 2040. As in Exhibit 19, we keep age- and gender-specific participation 
rates constant at their 2000 levels and impute the resulting LFTP in 2040. While the results 
displayed in Exhibit 19 are exclusively based on the medium-fertility population scenario, we 
now also show results for the alternative low- and high-fertility scenarios.
26 As can be seen in the 
upper part of Exhibit 19, fertility rates critically shape the LFTP in 2040. Under the low-fertility 
scenario, the fraction of workers to the total population goes up from 0.465 in 2000 to 0.509 in 
2040. Under the high-fertility scenario, the fraction slightly declines to 0.464. Higher fertility 
rates imply higher future youth dependency ratios and thus lower expected LFTP in 2040. This 
difference is even more pronounced when behavioral changes are taken into account. In the 
second part of Exhibit 22, we calculate “counterfactual” female labor force participation under 
the assumption that female labor supply responds to changes in fertility. Bloom et al. (2007)
27 
estimate the labor supply response for each age group; we use their point estimate and then 
calculate female labor force participation based on the original 2000 rates plus the estimated 
adjustment to changing fertility rates. Under the low-fertility scenario, this behavioral response is 
largest, leading to an increase in LFTP from 46.5% in 2000 to 53.6% in 2040. Under the high-
fertility scenario this effect is less pronounced, but still implies an increase in LFTP relative to 
2000, rather than the decrease expected in the absence of behavioral change.  
                                                 
22 Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Bryan Graham, 2003,. “Longevity and Life-cycle Savings,” Scandinavian 
Journal of. Economics, Vol. 105, September. 
23 Bloom, David E., David Canning, Rick Mansfield and Michael Moore (2007): “Demographic Change, Social 
Security Systems, and Savings”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54(1), pp 92-114.  
24 Blinder, Alan S., “Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006. 
25 Bloom, David E., David Canning, Guenther Fink, and Jocelyn Finlay, 2007, “Fertility and Female Labor Force 
Participation” NBER Working Paper #13583. Available at www.nber.org/papers/w13583 
26 The United Nations publishes population forecasts under three different scenarios: low fertility, medium fertility 
and high fertility. 
27 Bloom, David E., David Canning, Guenther Fink, and Jocelyn Finlay, 2007, op cit.   24 
It should be noted that the potential growth effects generated by changes in LFTP are relatively 
small. Under the assumption that output per worker stays constant (or is not affected by LFTP), 
an increase in LFTP from 46.5% to 53.6% as predicted under the most optimistic low-fertility 
scenario with behavioral response leads to an annual increase of 0.36 percentage points in real 
GDP per capita over the whole period. Under the high-fertility scenario, these effects are close to 
zero.  For  the  OECD  countries  the  expected  growth  effects  are  slightly  more  negative,  as 
summarized in Exhibit 23. Since fertility rates are expected to stay low under all scenarios, little 
change in total labor force participation is generated by the behavioral response. Nevertheless, 
even under the most pessimistic high fertility scenario, the  expected decrease in annual real 
income growth is expected to be a relatively modest 0.39 percentage points. 
 








Additional annual growth 
(percentage points) in real 
GDP per capita
No behavioral response
Predicted 2040: Low-fertility scenario 0.384 0.509 0.23
Predicted 2040: Medium-fertility scenario 0.369 0.486 0.11
Predicted 2040: High-fertility scenario 0.354 0.464 -0.01
Behavioral response
Predicted 2040: Low-fertility scenario 0.437 0.536 0.36
Predicted 2040: Medium-fertility scenario 0.401 0.502 0.19
Predicted 2040: High-fertility scenario 0.368 0.471 0.03
Actual 2000 0.373 0.465
 
Notes: Based on 174 countries. All averages are population weighted. 
Sources: United Nations (2007). World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. CD-ROM Edition - Extended 
Dataset.  United  Nations.    ILO  (2007):  ILO  Labor  Statistics  Online.  http://laborsta.ilo.org/.  Accessed 
November 2007. Own calculations. 
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Exhibit 23 – Labor force-to-population ratios 2000 and 2040 with and without female labor supply response: 





Labor force per 
capita, males 
and females
Additional annual growth 
(percentage points) in real 
GDP per capita
No behavioral response
Predicted 2040: Low-fertility scenario 0.375 0.448 -0.19
Predicted 2040: Medium-fertility scenario 0.368 0.436 -0.26
Predicted 2040: High-fertility scenario 0.360 0.424 -0.33
Behavioral response
Predicted 2040: Low-fertility scenario 0.385 0.453 -0.17
Predicted 2040: Medium-fertility scenario 0.363 0.433 -0.27
Predicted 2040: High-fertility scenario 0.341 0.414 -0.39
Actual 2000 0.411 0.484
 
Notes: Based on the 30 current OECD member countries. All averages are country weighted. 
Sources: United Nations (2007). World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. CD-ROM Edition - Extended 
Dataset.  United  Nations.    ILO  (2007):  ILO  Labor  Statistics  Online.  http://laborsta.ilo.org/.  Accessed 
November 2007. Own calculations. 
 
 
IV. Summary and Discussion 
 
Population pessimism redux 
 
For most of the 20
th century the dominant issue in the field of demography was the explosion in 
population  numbers  caused  by  the  lowering  of  mortality  rates  coupled  with  continuing  high 
fertility  rates.  The  predicted  negative  consequences  of  high  population  densities,  and  a  high 
population growth rate, seem not to have been borne out. Many of the predictions made about the 
immiserizing effects of population growth seem in retrospect to have been unduly alarmist. For 
example, between 1960 and 1999, global population doubled, rising from 3 to 6 billion, but 
income  per  capita  tripled,  decisively  refuting  the  predictions  of  population  pessimists  from 
Malthus to Ehrlich.
28,29  
    
Following  the  1986  National  Academy  of  Sciences’  report  on  population  growth,  the  non-
alarmist position came to dominate economists’ thinking on population (Kelley (2000)). While 
rapid population growth posed problems, the report argued that market mechanisms and non-
                                                 
28 According to Malthus, who wrote around 1800, when world population first crossed the 1 billion mark, 
“…[population growth] appears … to be decisive against the possible existence of a society, all the members of 
which should live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure; and feel no anxiety about providing the means of 
subsistence for themselves and families.” In a similar vein, Paul Ehrlich asserted in the late 1960s, that “The battle is 
over. In the 1970s hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death.”  
29 According to the Penn World Tables (version 6.2), total global GDP per capita in 2000 was US$7565 (at 2000 
purchasing power parity). The same number in 1960 was US$2495, which means that global GDP per capita has 
increased by 202% (or tripled) over the period 1960-2000, at the same time as the total population doubled.  In terms 
of growth rates, this corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 2.8%.   26 
market institutions were usually sufficiently flexible to ameliorate those problems. In particular, 
projections of the effects of population growth based on unchanged behavior elsewhere in the 
economy might give a very bleak picture but in general would be very misleading.  Changing 
incentives  through  price  changes,  and  changing  non-market  institutional  arrangements  to 
promote new behaviors, could have large effects and produce responses that would alleviate the 
problems associated with population growth. 
 
The population debate focused on population numbers and missed to a large extent the issue of 
age  structure  changes.  Population  growth  caused  by  rising  fertility,  and  population  growth 
caused by falling mortality, are likely to have quite different economic consequences because 
they have different age structure effects. We have examined some of these consequences above. 
However,  it  is  important  to  remember  the  lessons  of  the  earlier  debate.  Analysis  based  on 
"accounting  effects",  in  particular  on  the  assumption  that  age-specific  behavior  remains 
unchanged as the age structure evolves, may be misleading. When this type of analysis predicts 
large  reductions  in  welfare  we  should  be  particularly  suspicious  since  these  are  exactly  the 
conditions that will produce incentives for behavioral change. 
 
This reasoning also applies to an assessment of the economic growth implications of continued 
improvements in health and reductions in mortality into old age, coupled with the aging of the 
baby boom generation. How well countries cope with the challenge of population aging will 
likely depend to a large extent on the flexibility of their markets and the appropriateness of their 
institutions and policies.  
 
The preceding section explored the economic growth implications of population aging. The key 
premise of the inquiry is that labor supply, productivity, and savings vary over the life cycle. 
This  implies  that  the  age  structure  of  a  population  may  be  consequential  for  its  economic 
performance – as measured by income per capita. Large youth and elderly cohorts might slow 
the  pace  of  economic  growth,  while  large  working-age  cohorts  might  speed  it.  However,  in 
addition to these "accounting" effects (assuming age-specific behavior remains unchanged we 
can  simply  calculate  the  consequences  of  age  structure  change  mechanically)  there  are  also 
behavioral effects. For example, increased longevity – a key driver of population aging -- can 
change life-cycle behavior, leading to a longer working life or higher savings for retirement.  
 
One view is that population aging in the developed countries is likely to have a large effect, 
reducing  income  per  capita,  mainly  through  the  fall  in  labor  supply  per  capita  that  will 
accompany the reduction in the share of working-age population.  However, even if this occurs, 
it may not be as harmful as it at first appears, for five reasons. First, as seen in the previous 
section, rough estimates of the magnitude of the effect of population aging on the rate of labor 
force  participation,  and  the  concomitant  effect  of  changes  in  labor  force  participation  on 
economic growth are, for most countries, of modest size. 
 
Second, income per capita is not a welfare measure. Nordhaus (2003) estimates that over the 20
th 
century  improvements  in  longevity  made  a  contribution  to  increasing  welfare  in  the  United 
States  of  roughly  the  same  magnitude  as  the  rise  in  consumption  levels.  The  longer  life 
expectancies that lead to aging can be thought of as improving welfare directly by expanding the 
population’s  lifetime  budget  set.  Even  if  rising  life  expectancy  were  to  lead  to  reduced   27 
consumption levels per period, it is difficult to argue that the net effect of increased longevity on 
welfare will be negative.      
    
Third,  welfare  depends  on  consumption,  not  income.  Typically  household  income  falls  at 
retirement,  but  consumption  may  remain  relatively  high.  It  follows  that  we  could  have  two 
populations,  each  enjoying  the  same  consumption  stream  over  the  same  lifespan,  but  the 
population  with  a  larger  elderly  age  cohort  will  have  lower  per  capita  income.  For  these 
populations, income per capita would vary with the age structure, but lifetime welfare would be 
equal.  Thus,  aging-induced  declines  in  income  per  capita  are  not  necessarily  indicative  of 
corresponding declines in welfare. 
 
Fourth, while the consequences of a fall in per capita income may not be all that bad for welfare, 
it is not even clear that population aging will lead to a fall in per capita income.  Increases in life 
expectancy in the United States over the last two centuries have been associated with reductions 
in  the  age-specific  incidence  of  disease,  disability,  and  morbidity  (Costa  1998;  Fogel  1994, 
1997).  Mathers  and  others  (2001)  show  that  health-adjusted  life  expectancy  (each  life  year 
weighted by a measure of health status) rises approximately one for one with life expectancy 
across countries. Other studies, mostly for the US and other wealthy industrial countries, imply 
that the morbid years are compressed – both relatively and absolutely -- as life expectancy rises. 
Agents can respond to an expectation of longer healthy lifespans by working longer or saving 
more (i.e., consuming less). If they work longer they can keep their consumption levels high and 
need only save at the same rate as before for old age.  If they decide to take extra leisure and 
retire at the same age as before they will have lower consumption levels throughout their life and 
will need higher savings rates while working.  Bloom, Canning, and Moore (2004 and 2007) 
examine this issue theoretically and argue that when health improves and longevity rises the 
optimal response is likely to be a longer worker life, without the need for higher savings.
30 To 
the extent that working lives lengthen in response to longer lifespans there is no reduction in 
income  levels.  Indeed  average  income  and  consumption  per  capita  can  remain  high.  The 
assumption of fixed age-specific rates of labor force participation assumes no behavioral change 
when in fact such changes may occur. 
 
Fifth, old age "dependency" is something of a misnomer.  Lee (2000) shows that, in all pre-
industrial societies for which he was able to assemble evidence, the flow of transfers is from the 
middle aged and old to the young. In developed countries, on the other hand, both the young and 
the old benefit from government transfers, and the net pattern of transfers is towards the elderly.  
However,  at  the  household  level  in  the  United  States,  elderly  households  make  significant 
transfers to middle aged households, undoing to some extent the effects of government policy. 
The dependency burden of the elderly is a function of the institutional welfare systems that are in 
place rather than an immutable state of affairs.
31  
 
                                                 
30 The tendency towards early retirement is explained by an income effect with people wanting more leisure time as 
incomes rise.   
31 Mason et al. (2006) propose and investigate a National Transfer Accounts methodology to aid in understanding 
the extent and effect of intergenerational transfers.   28 
Analysis of the effects of population aging on economic growth represents virgin territory. The 
size and nature of the current demographic shift is unprecedented, so past experience cannot 
provide a guide. Demographers and economists therefore need to rely on models.  
 
Insofar as population aging leads to labor supply reductions that cause wages to rise, and given 
that different countries are in different phases of the demographic cycle, international migration 
flows are likely to be stimulated. Such flows will smooth the age distribution since working-age 
individuals  account  for  a  large  proportion  of  international  migrants.  However,  judging  by 
historical  experience,  and  in  a  context  of  widespread  institutional  and  social  constraints  on 
immigration,  the  magnitude  of  the  increases  needed  to  smooth  the  age  distributions  is 
inordinately large and not, as a practical matter, likely to be a decisive response to population 
aging. Although migrants themselves benefit greatly, moreover, it is not yet well established  
whether immigration results in net economic benefits or losses to receiving countries. Lee and 
Miller (2000) finds only very small net fiscal impacts of immigration to the US over the next 
century.
32   
 
 
The importance of policy 
 
The policy environment is crucial in determining the effect of aging on economic growth. The 
problem of population aging is more a problem of rigid and outmoded policies and institutions 
than a problem of demographic change per se. Policies need to be developed that account for the 
natural incentives individuals have to adjust their behavior in the face of population aging.  
 
Among  the  most  commonly  mooted  policy  changes  is  to  alter  retirement  incentives  so  that 
people can fulfill their expressed desires to work longer in response to expectations of greater 
longevity. More flexible old-age pension arrangements combined with increases in the official 
retirement age will encourage prolonged workforce participation. Legal and cultural efforts to 
discourage age discrimination by employers may also be required. Lifelong education programs 
could assist in these efforts, by helping people adapt their skills and knowledge to the demands 
of a changing economy.  
 
Investment in improving the health of those aged 60 or over is a further policy option. Not only 
does  this  reduce  the  burden  on  health  care  and  social  security  systems,  but  by  compressing 
morbidity into fewer years late in life, it also enables people to work for longer. As Zweifel, 
Felder, and Meiers (1999) have shown, health care costs appear to be concentrated in the last few 
years  of  life  regardless  of  age,  so  population  aging  defers  rather  than  increases  costs.
33  In 
addition  to  easing  strains  on  state  finances,  the  compression  of  morbidity  will  enable  older 
people to continue to contribute their expertise and knowledge to economies.  
 
Policy should also encourage increased labor force participation. Laws against sex discrimination 
have helped open up the workplace to women in many wealthy countries – middle and low-
                                                 
32 Ronald Lee & Timothy Miller, 2000. "Immigration, Social Security, and Broader Fiscal Impacts," American 
Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 350-354, May. 
33 Zweifel S, Felder S, Meiers M. Ageing of population and health care expenditure: a red herring? Health. Econ 
1999; 8: 485–496.   29 
income countries with aging populations would likely benefit from similar measures. Upward 
pressure on wages is likely to increase women’s participation in the workforce, and this can be 
complemented by policies that facilitate mothers combining  work  and  family, such as state-
funded  childcare  and  more  flexible  working  hours.  The  latter,  of  course,  also  incentivizes 
childrearing, with long-term impacts on the age structure.  
 
The issue of immigration is also vital; policymakers in aging developed countries have not yet 
successfully  made  the  case  for  increased  immigration  from  the  developing  world,  but 
demographic  imbalances  mean  demand  by  employers  is  likely  to  intensify  in  the  coming 
decades.  Compensating  those  who  lose  out  from  the  process  (such  as  low-skilled  receiving-
country workers) might help make opening up to migration more politically feasible.  
 
A  further  important  policy  consideration  is  to  address  the  funding  gap  caused  by  the 
intergenerational transfers implicit in pay-as-you-go health and pension systems.
34 In an aging 
society,  these  imply  that  small  cohorts  of  working-age  people  will  make  transfers  to  large 
cohorts of elderly. But, even under a pay-as-you-go system, it is not inevitable that the old must 
depend on transfers from younger generations. Adjusting premiums and benefits or making a 
transition to full funding or a system of private accounts, whereby individuals effectively draw at 
least part of their pensions from investments made during their time in work, could help reduce 
old  age  “dependency”.  Fully  funded  systems  mean  that  older  workers  who  continue  in 
employment benefit by having a larger sum to draw on when they eventually retire. Moving 
toward such a system would require robust institutions that can both attract sufficient savings and 
invest  them  productively  and  safely.  There  are  some  concerns  that  the  increases  in  savings 
required to move away from a pay-as-you-go system will mean investment opportunities become 
scarcer  and  returns  diminish.  Although  Poterba  (2004)  finds  that  the  historic  effect  of 
demography  on  real  rates  of  return  has  been  small,
35  Turner  (2006)  injects  some  major 
cautionary  notes  into  this  discussion:  (a)  higher  savings  rates  will  tend  to  lower  returns  on 
investments; (b) when new generations are smaller, both pay-as-you-go and fully-funded pension 
systems will face falling asset prices, so the latter are not a cure-all for troubled pension systems; 
and (c) the performance of funded systems depends on global capital markets, not just those of 
any particular country. He concludes that fully funded systems will not necessarily provide a 
complete  answer  to  demographic  change  and  that  pay-as-you-go  systems  can  be  adjusted  to 
achieve "many of the supposed advantages of funded systems". Heller (2003) emphasizes the 
fact  that  the  historically  unprecedented  commitments  governments  have  already  made  to 





                                                 
34 Weil (2006) highlights the importance of this issue in saying, "The most important means by which aging will 
affect aggregate output is the distortion from taxes to fund PAYGO pensions."  
35 Poterba, 2004.  
36 Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Leibfritz (1999) review the use of generational accounting as a means of studying these 
and broader questions about intergenerational transfers.  
37  Barr and Diamond (2006) systematically address many of the issues and controversies in the arena of pensions 
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An uncertain future 
 
Of course, humility is required when making decisions based on future demographic projections. 
The sources of uncertainty remain considerable. Population projections, for example, are not cast 
in stone. The possibility of changes in fertility behavior or health shocks could tilt the balance 
between young and old in unforeseen ways. As discussed above, projections of population size 
and structure can change quite significantly even over short periods. Longevity projections are 
also precarious and hotly debated. Trends in diet and lifestyle as well as medical and public 
health advances could combine to raise or lower life expectancy in future. Technology has a 
crucial role to play. The compression of morbidity occurring today is partly driven by new health 
technology,  but  it  is  uncertain  whether  technological  advance  will  continue,  diminish,  or 
accelerate  in  future,  and  what  cost  implications  it  will  have.  Trends  such  as  the  obesity 
“epidemic” could dampen the positive effects of technology. The WHO projects that by 2025 
300 million people will be obese; the WHO also notes that the health impacts of rising obesity 
prevalence could reverse life expectancy gains in some countries.
38 Non-health related events 
such as climate change or war could also have an unpredictable effect on longevity.  
 
Nor is it clear whether the economic impacts of aging will be uniform across societies. In the 
developed  world,  longer  lifespans  have  been  accompanied  by  a  shift  in  support  for  older 
generations from families to the state. In many developing countries, families remain pivotal to 
elder  care  and  as  the  lifespan  becomes  longer  there  may  be  disruption  to  family  structures, 
leading to a similar move towards public transfer systems and savings as that experienced in 
wealthier parts of the world.   
 
Although drawing lessons from the past may not be possible for an aging future, we do know 
that  some  societies  in  the  past  century  have  coped  well  with  the  major  demographic  shift 
represented by population growth. The world economy has had the flexibility to absorb and in 
general benefit from dramatic increases in population numbers. If today’s policymakers take 
prompt action to prepare for the effects of aging, the next major shift is likely to cause much less 
hardship than many fear.  
                                                 
38 T.L. Visscher and J.C. Seidell (2001): The public health impact of obesity, Annu. Rev. Public Health 22, pp. 355–
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